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INTRODUCTION 

For the better part of forty years, federal courts have employed 
the broad general language of Rule lOb-5 1 to circumscribe the use for 
trading of material non public information2 concerning a corporation 
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1. Rule lOb-5 provides as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1985). 
2. In this article, we employ the term "inside" or material, non public information to 
cover both true "inside information," i.e., nonpublic information originating from within 
and concerning the issuer of the securities involved, and "market information," i. e., infor­
mation from external sources but which may affect the value of the issuer's securities as 
traded. 
See, e.g., the discussion of "market information" in Fleischer, Mundheim and Mur­
phy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. 
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by "insiders" of that corporation. The ripples of liability gradually 
have spread outward from the center-from true insiders3 to tempo­
rary or "quasi" insiders4 to true outsiders such as "tippees"5 and even 
"subtippees."6 The United States Supreme Court set out, in United 
States v. Chiarella, 7 limitations regarding the circumstances in which 
liability under Rule lOb-5 can be imposed. The Court followed up its 
Chiarella ruling with a decision three years later in SEC v. Dirks, 8 a 
decision intended to specify similar limits to the liability under Rule 
lOb-5 of tippees trading on material non public information. 
The central holding of Chiarella is that an insider will be obli­
gated to "abstain or disclose" under Rule lOb-5 only where the insider 
has a preexisting duty, arising out of a fiduciary or similar relationship 
of trust or confidence, to the party injured by the insider's trading 
transactions.9 In the absence of any such relationship, the insider is 
not liable for injuries or damages suffered by a person buying or selling 
securities without access to the same information as the insider, nor is 
the insider subject to criminal or administrative sanctions. Dirks rep­
resents the related proposition that an outsider, e.g., a tippee, buying 
L. REV. 798, 799 (1973). The courts have not distinguished between different types of 
inside information for purposes of IOb-5 liability generally, a result which seems consistent 
with the broad wording of Rule IOb-5. 
3. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In this context, insiders include directors, officers, and em­
ployees of an issuer of securities who have access to information regarding that issuer by 
virtue of their position with the issuer. 
4. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. 
Supp. 1397, 1402-03 (C.D. Cal. 1983). Such terms include persons (for example, business 
associates, independent contractors) who are not traditional insiders but assume the duties 
of such on a temporary basis by virtue of a special relationship with the issuer. Id. at 1403. 
5. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (2d Cir. 
1974). The term "tippee" customarily is used to refer to a person who has no preexisting 
relationship with an issuer but who obtains non public information concerning that issuer 
directly or indirectly from an insider. 
6. See, e.g., SEC v. Musella, 578 F. SUpp. 425,438-39 (1984). A sUbtippee is a per­
son who receives material, nonpublic information from a tippee rather than a tipper. In 
many of the principal cases involving the liability of a tippee, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission also has brought civil or criminal proceedings against persons receiving infor­
mation from the principal tippees. Thus, for example, many of the persons charged in SEC 
V. Musella received the inside information concerning pending acquisitions from Alan Ihne, 
the service manager at the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm, through a former stockbroker. 
Other examples of more well known sUbtippees would include the various institutional 
clients of Raymond Dirks, the girl friend of the stockbroker tipped by Paul Thayer, and 
certain clients of the stockbrokers tipped by R. Foster Winans. See notes 58-59 and 80-85 
and accompanying text. 
7. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
8. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
9. 445 U.S. at 232-33. 
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or selling securities upon material, nonpublic information from an in­
sider is liable only if the insider has breached a fiduciary relationship 
in disclosing the information to the tippee, and the tippee knows or 
should have known that the insider has committed such a breach. \0 In 
other words, a tippee's liability is totally derivative from, and depen­
dent upon, a breach of duty by the insider. 
A flood of articles and commentary from both the academic com­
munity and members of the practicing bar11 has followed the Chiarella 
and Dirks decisions. Many commentators have bemoaned the narrow­
ness of the fiduciary duty standard articulated in those decisions. 12 
Some have urged greater use of an alternative ground for liability, 
such as the misappropriation theory or some other concept,13 and still 
others have proposed new legislative proscriptions. 14 Most agree that 
some standards in addition to or in lieu of the fiduciary duty tests used 
by the Supreme Court in Chiarella and Dirks are appropriate if addi­
tional troublesome conduct involving securities trading by persons 
with access to material, nonpublic information is to be deterred. Of 
particular concern is trading by persons other than (1) traditional in­
10. 463 U.S. at 660-64. 
11. See, e.g., Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory ofLiability for Trading on 
Nonpub/ic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (1984); Fischel, Insider Trading and 
Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127 (1984); Heller, Chiarella. SEC Rule J4e-3 and Dirks: "Fair­
ness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982); Langevoort, Insider Trading and 
the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1982); Macey, 
From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984); Report of the Task Force on Regulation ofInsider Trading, 41 
Bus. LAW. 223 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Task Force]. 
12. See particularly Langevoort, supra note 11, at 16-39; Aldave, supra note 11, at 
107-11; Phillips and Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Needfor Legislative Repair, 13 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 65 (1984); Note, Insider Trading: Circumventing the Restrictive Con­
tours of the Chiarella and Dirks Decisions, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (1985); Task Force, 
supra note 11, at 233-35. 
13. Several lower courts have formulated an alternative basis for dealing with insider 
trading under Rule 10b-5 in the form of the so-called "misappropriation theory," the out­
lines of which first were suggested in Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Chiarella, 
445 U.S. at 240-41. See infra notes 53-95 and accompanying text. 
14. Congress has enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, intended to strengthen 
the enforcement efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding insider trad­
ing. That legislation introduces additional twists to the plot, insofar as it purports, on one 
hand. to leave the existing case law under Rule IOb-5 undisturbed and yet, on the other 
hand, clearly is premised upon policy bases broader than those accepted or articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Chiarella or Dirks. See infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text. 
And, not to be outdone, an American Bar Association Task Force has come up with spe­
cific recommendations for legislative and/or administrative rulemaking proposals to fur­
ther clarify the applicable standards governing insider trading. Task Force, supra note 11, 
at 253-64. 
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siders, that is, persons who have a preexisting relationship to the is­
suer, or (2) tippees of such insiders, but who nevertheless trade on 
inside information. Indeed, the obstacles to imposing liability on such 
traders (whom we label "outsiders" for ease of reference) under the 
present framework is our main criticism of that framework. 
While it no doubt would be helpful were Congress to enact legis­
lation explicitly defining what we mean by "insider" and/or "outsider 
trading" and proscribing specific conduct as unlawful thereunder, it 
seems unlikely that any such legislation will be forthcoming in the 
near future. IS For the meantime, we are left with an unfinished judi­
cial formulation on our hands derived from Rule lOb-5. This formula­
tion performs adequately in certain conditions but has significant 
limitations in other circumstances. Our effort here, therefore, is to see 
if we can chart out a broader acceptable hypothesis by which insider 
and outsider trading can be prohibited. 
We propose to start with an unfettered look at the underlying 
bases for prohibiting insider trading, that is, to identify the possible 
interests which might be affected in any particular transaction where 
someone possesses and uses an informational advantage in the 
purchase or sale of securities. We then briefly consider the principal 
concerns which have caused the Supreme Court to prescribe limita­
tions to the existing theories of liability. 
In a subsequent part, we undertake a brief review of the develop­
ment of the existing jurisprudence under Rule lOb-5-the common 
law roots; the "possession" theory espoused in Matter of Cady, Rob­
erts & Co. 16 and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur; 17 the fiduciary principle 
limitation announced in Chiarella; and the misappropriation theory 
articulated in United States v. Newman, 18 SEC v. Materia l9 and United 
States v. Winans,2o among others. Finally, we attempt to describe an 
alternative formulation which we believe is both simpler and more 
IS. At the hearings on the proposed Insider Trading Sanctions Act, various wit­
nesses suggested that Congress add specific language defining what constitutes insider trad­
ing. The Senate and House Committees ultimately concluded that such a provision might 
"reduce flexibility" and "create new ambiguities" and thus chose not to attempt any statu­
tory definition. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1933. H.R. REP., 98th Congo 1st 
Sess. I, 13 (1983). 
16. 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). See supra notes 47-50 for a discussion of the posses­
sion theory developed from the Cady Roberts decision by the courts in Texas GulfSulphur 
and subsequent decisions. 
17. 401 F.2d at 848. 
18. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983). 
19. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2112 (1985). 
20. 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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consistent with the underlying policy reasons for prohibiting insider 
trading, and yet at the same time addresses the concerns which have 
motivated the Supreme Court's search for limiting principles. 
I. IDENTIFYING THE INTERESTS 
We believe that there are at least four interests protected by 
adopting a regulatory scheme which imposes liability for engaging in 
securities transactions on the basis of material, non public information: 
1. prevention of injury to a shareholder who buys or sells a 
security without lawful access to comparable information possessed 
by another person engaged in a contemporaneous transaction ("in­
jury to shareholder"); 
2. protection to the owner of proprietary or confidential in­
formation against the misuse of that information ("injury to prop­
erty right"); 
3. assurance of the integrity of and confidence in the public 
markets for various corporations' securities ("injury to market"); 
and 
4. prevention of unjust enrichment of a person using an infor­
mational advantage not obtained through lawful means. 
The first interest focuses on a person who engages in a purchase 
or sales transaction but would not have done so on the same terms had 
that person possessed the same information as was available to other 
persons engaged in opposite transactions at the very same time. Such 
a shareholder was operating upon assumptions as to the existing cir­
cumstances which are, in fact, mistaken. We deem it unfair that 
others who know the real circumstances by a means other than by 
their own effort and diligence should be able to take advantage of the 
former. Such unfairness or injury can arise irrespective of either the 
precise method of trading (direct dealings or impersonal market trans­
actions) or the status of the wrongdoer (insider, quasi-insider, or 
outsider). 
The second interest concerns the protection of information which 
is valuable in the hands of the owner because the owner has expended 
resources to develop the information and/or has the opportunity now 
to realize value from its own use of that information. A trader's im­
proper use of that information may injure that owner either (1) by 
depriving the owner of the opportunity to realize full value,2! (2) by 
21. Assume, for example, that an institutional investor has expended considerable 
sums on research regarding the probable outcome of major pending litigation between two 
parties. Based upon the results of that research, the institutional investor proposes to buy 
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increasing acquisition costs,22 or (3) by injury to the owner's reputa­
tion and goodwil}.23 While the injury may be just as real as an injury 
to shareholders discussed above, the causal linkage or relationship be­
tween the injury and the insider'S wrongful gain may be more 
attenuated. 
The third interest concerns the protection of the market gener­
ally. Among the crucial differences between direct dealing transac­
tions and impersonal market transactions are that in the latter, one 
party generally will not know what person is on the opposite side of 
the transaction, and thus will be unable, as a practical matter, to assess 
the likelihood that the other person possesses any informational ad­
vantage. In a face-to-face transaction, on the other hand, a selling 
shareholder knows the identity of the person with whom he or she is 
dealing and has the opportunity, whether or not used, to inquire as to 
the state of any special facts or circumstances that may be known to 
that person. That opportunity generally is absent in an impersonal or 
remote market transaction. Accordingly, if shareholders perceive that 
others are trading in the impersonal trading markets with significant 
informational advantages which the former will be unable to obtain 
through their own efforts, they may be reluctant to trade at all. Thus, 
prohibitions on insider trading are intended to give assurances to sell­
ers and buyers that they are not assuming, in addition to ordinary 
the shares of one of the litigants and sell shares of the other. Before the investor is able to 
do so, various employees with access to the information buy and sell (short) shares of the 
companies, which has the effect of driving up the market price of the prevailing litigant and 
driving down the market price of the losing litigant and, in both cases, reducing the profits 
otherwise attainable by the institutional investor. 
22. Obviously, had Texas Gulf Sulphur's test result information been disclosed to the 
public or others prior to the time it completed acquisition of additional land and mining 
rights in the Kidd Creek area, the costs of such acquisition would have been substantially 
higher. Similarly, purchases in the marketplace by individuals such as Messrs. Chiarella or 
Materia, using information theoretically known only to the prospective bidder, could have 
the effect of driving up the price of the target companies' stocks (either directly or by 
"signaling" to others the interest of the acquirer). Indeed, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., has com­
menced a damages action in United States District Court for Northern Texas against Paul 
Thayer, a former Busch director, and other defendants accused oftrading on "misappropri­
ated" inside information, alleging that the purchase of shares of Campbell Taggart, Inc., 
the target company, by Anheuser-Busch, Inc., cost substantially more as a result of the 
improper tipping and trading which occurred. 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 45, at 
2010 (Nov. 15, 1985). 
23. The misuse of confidential information by an employee of a financial printing 
firm or a newspaper publisher obviously can cause injury to the reputation of those firms 
with their clients. See, e.g., the discussion in Materia, 745 F.2d at 202 ("Among a financial 
printer's most valuable assets is its reputation as a safe repository for client secrets.") and 
Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 845 ("[T]he Wall Street Journal's reputation for journalistic integ­
rity was sullied. "). 
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market risks, a risk of dealing with persons possessing unfair informa­
tional advantages.24 
This particular type of injury, however, is not one where damages 
are suffered by an identifiable participant in an ascertainable amount; 
the harm which can result is more in the nature of injury to the value 
of a public good or service generally. 25 
The first three interests concern one or more specific types of in­
jury suffered by some party as a result of insider trading. The fourth, 
on the other hand, concerns the benefit or advantage obtained or real­
ized by the wrongdoer. It is important to note that this fourth interest 
does not necessarily extend to every person who trades using an infor­
mational advantage. Thus, traditional concepts of restitution or un­
just enrichment require that one person has by "some unconscientious 
act or breach of good faith . . . obtained an undue advantage over 
another."26 In this regard, it is useful to distinguish, as did Professor 
Page Keeton almost fifty years ago, among three alternative means by 
which a person obtains material, nonpublic information: (1) by 
chance, (2) by effort, or (3) by unlawful or improper means.27 As to 
the third of these classifications, we have little difficulty arguing that it 
is unjust for a person to profit from an informational advantage unlaw­
fully or improperly obtained. On the other hand, we rarely begrudge 
persons the opportunity to trade upon informational advantages devel­
24. See, e.g., Texas GulfSulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 852 ("It was the intent of Congress 
that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical market risks ...."). 
See also Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 355-56 (1979). 
25. We refer to confidence in the integrity of the market as a public good or service 
because investors in the marketplace cannot assess in advance the risk, with respect to any 
particular security, that insider trading is likely to occur, and thus the risk cannot simply be 
factored into the "costs" any particular investor chooses to pay. See, e.g., Dooley, Enforce­
ment ofInsider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. I, 39-41 (1980): 
[I]nvestors cannot before the fact distinguish those companies whose insiders 
trade on confidential information from those whose insiders do not. This distinc­
tion is impossible not only because insider trading is difficult to detect but also 
because the opportunities for insider trading are dependent on the fortuitous oc­
currence of significant events and are therefore distributed randomly throughout 
the market. 
Id. at 41. The legislative history of the recent Insider Trading Sanctions Act indicates a 
significant concern on the part of Congress with promotion and maintenance of investor 
confidence in the national securities markets. See 129 CONGo REC. H7012-13 (daily ed. 
Sept. 19, 1983) (statements of Reps. Wirth and Oxley); 130 CONGo REC. H7757 (daily ed. 
July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. DingelI); and 130 CONGo REC. S8912 (daily ed. June 29, 
1984) (statement of Rep. D'Amato). 
26. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 873 (5th ed. 1941). 
27. See Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 
(1936). 
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oped through their own lawful industry and effort; indeed, in the ab­
sence of any incentive to develop informational advantages, the 
securities markets might not function efficiently.28 Access obtained by 
chance rather than by effort is a more difficult circumstance to judge. 
While our society generally views windfalls resulting from events of 
chance as not unfair,29 the line between luck and breach of good faith 
sometimes may be hard to ascertain.30 
In any given instance of insider trading, the trader will realize a 
substantial benefit, and one or more of the injuries described above 
ordinarily will occur as well. Consider, for example, the case where an 
officer of Texas Gulf Sulphur bought shares of Texas Gulf Sulphur on 
the undisclosed news of the Canadian test drilling site results. There 
was little question that the corporate officer benefited directly when 
the value of the shares acquired appreciated following the dissemina­
tion of the favorable news. We can identify as among the injured in 
that instance the following: (1) injury to shareholders, that is, those 
persons who sold their shares but would not have had the test results 
previously been disclosed publicly; and (2) to a rather unquantifiable 
extent, the integrity of the trading markets, that is, investors will be 
hesitant to participate in the market for Texas Gulf sulphur securities 
specifically, and for other securities generally, if and when they believe 
there is a substantial likelihood that others have significant improper 
or unfair informational advantages. 
In other insider trading situations, different interests may be af­
fected. Assume, for example, that a genetic engineering firm has 
achieved a significant research breakthrough which when announced 
will generate substantial market interest in the firm's shares. The firm 
wishes to hold back on a public announcement until it can both file 
necessary patent applications to protect its proprietary interest and 
lock up certain sources of supply for critical raw materials. A key 
employee buys shares of the firm's stock on the basis of the material, 
28. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 361-62. 
29. Professor Aldave cites the story given at a congressional hearing of a motorist 
driving on a deserted road when he observes a huge explosion in the XYZ plant. The 
motorist, who owns XYZ stock, immediately calls his broker and instructs the sale of the 
XYZ stock before the disaster becomes publicly known. The witness concluded that the 
average investor would not bar the motorist from selling securities. See Aldave, supra note 
11, at 123, n.119. 
30. Indeed, we have a difficult time being clear as to the proper distinction. Is a 
person who overhears a conversation in which inside information is disclosed and then acts 
upon it simply lucky (to be in such a place at such a time so as to hear that information), or 
are they acting in bad faith when they proceed to reap profits in securities transactions 
based on that information? Under our formulation, the individual probably will be liable 
for any profits obtained. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. 
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nonpublic information to which he has access. Again, the insider ben­
efits directly when the value of the shares acquired appreciates follow­
ing the announcement of the favorable development. In addition, 
however, the firm itself may be injured if the insider's trading activities 
necessitate or result in earlier disclosure of the development before the 
firm is able to obtain proprietary protection or negotiate its raw mater­
ials requirements contracts. 3 ! 
II. COUNTERVAILING CONCERNS 
While protection of the foregoing interests generally supports the 
imposition of liability for insider trading transactions, there are coun­
tervailing concerns. First is the concern for a clear linkage between 
the interests being protected and the particular transaction alleged to 
have caused injury. For example, the general prohibitions against in­
sider trading probably can be applied in transactions involving direct 
dealing between two parties without untoward consequences. When 
one of two shareholders in XYZ Corporation, individual L, buys the 
XYZ shares of the other shareholder K without telling K of material 
developments which will enhance the value of the XYZ shares signifi­
cantly, we can identify a measurable loss to shareholder K and link it 
to an identifiable corresponding unjust gain to shareholder L.32 On 
the other hand, when we move from direct dealing transactions to im­
personal transactions effected over a national securities exchange or in 
the over-the-counter market, that corresponding linkage usually is 
lost. Even though there may well be identifiable losses suffered by 
shareholders operating at an informational disadvantage and identifi­
able gains improperly realized by persons trading with an informa­
tional advantage, the "linkage" between the two may be exceedingly 
difficult to establish. If there is no verifiable connection between the 
two identifiable amounts, we confront substantial complications in set­
ting the appropriate measure of damages.33 
Second is a concern that investors have adequate guidance or no­
31. In this instance, the interests of the selling shareholders conflict with those of the 
firm. In other words, while the firm will have a bona fide business reason to delay disclo­
sure of the material development, that will adversely affect persons selling shares of the firm 
who would not have done so had they known of the development. 
32. The hypothetical used is substantially the factual situation in the first federal 
district court proceeding recognizing a private right of action under Rule IOb-5, Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
33. Thus, for example, in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
495 F.2d 228, 232-33 (2d Cir. 1974), the plaintiffs proved that the defendants had sold 
165,000 shares of Douglas Aircraft stock over a period of four days. During the compara­
ble time period approximately 605,300 shares were traded on the New York Stock Ex­
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tice as to what mayor may not be an unlawful transaction. Without 
some guiding or limiting principles or framework, it is difficult for an 
investor to determine whether or not he or she has violated insider 
trading prohibitions. The very nature of the marketplace puts a pre­
mium on investors' obtaining all information relevant to their invest­
ment decisions. Furthermore, how is an individual to prove that he or 
she did not act on material, nonpublic information not available to 
another trading at approximately the same time? To state the matter 
in another way, how can there be certainty and predictability of conse­
quences for market traders unless the attaching conditions and limits 
of liability are known? 
Last is a concern that broad prohibitions on insider trading may 
stifle market efficiency. When one moves from direct dealing transac­
tions where we can easily allocate responsibilities to impersonal na­
tional market and exchange transactions, how can we avoid adopting 
rules or prohibitions which may have a significant adverse impact 
upon lawful efforts to gain informational advantage? When partici­
pants and markets are dispersed, the process by which an individual 
investor can obtain the greatest amount of useful information prelimi­
nary to a sale or purchase of stock decision may be enhanced best by 
contracting with an intermediary or professional (for example, a finan­
cial analyst) to obtain the information.34 Presumably, we do not want 
to deny that or any other investor the opportunity to acquire such 
information if he or she is willing to pay for such services and if those 
services are available to any other person willing to pay to acquire the 
same. In other words, whatever prohibitions we adopt should not un­
reasonably interfere with lawful efforts, theoretically available to all, to 
obtain a temporary informational advantage. A general prohibition 
against any person seeking an informational advantage would destroy 
the functions and significance assumed in the marketplace by in­
termediaries such as financial analysts. Would the financial markets 
then have any incentive at all to be efficient, to reward diligence and 
effort for ferreting out information so that securities will reflect their 
intrinsic values? 
These three concerns clearly were the major considerations shap­
ing the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella and Dirks to limit the 
scope of various persons' liability under rule lOb-S. After reviewing 
the general development of the Rule lOb-S jurisprudence up until the 
change. Are the defendants liable for the damages suffered by the purchasers of 165,000 
shares or 605,300 shares? 
34. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 339-43. 
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present time, we will return to attempt to address these concerns 
through our alternative formulation. 
III. ORIGINS OF INSIDER TRADING DOCTRINES 
In tracing the development of the doctrinal law of Rule lOb-5, it 
is appropriate to start with the theories at common law which tradi­
tionally applied to bipartite, direct dealing transactions. These cases 
reveal two separate theories justifying private recoveries for insider 
trading transactions. 
The first theory developed out of fraud concepts, beginning with 
the tort of active misrepresentation and eventually extending liability 
to nondisclosure situations as well. The focus there, of course, was on 
the injury suffered by the person who bought or sold securities as a 
result of the misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Affirmative or active 
misrepresentation cases in which a person misrepresents the true state 
of affairs to the other party to the purchase or sale long have been 
recognized as supporting the imposition of liability.35 While a differ­
ent rule initially applied with respect to those who traded in silence,36 
liability often could be established under a "special facts" doctrine. 37 
Furthermore, a separate basis for recovery in bipartite transactions 
was available through the application of the equitable concept of un­
just enrichment. Unlike the misrepresentation or constructive fraud 
cases which look to the injury suffered by the victim, the principal goal 
of the law of unjust enrichment or restitution is to punish the wrong­
doer, that is, to prevent unjust enrichment of a person who has bene­
fited from the infringement of another person's interest or by another's 
10ss.38 
In several of the common law cases most often cited by the fed­
35. Barber v. Martin, 67 Neb. 445, 93 N.W. 722 (1903); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 
498,77 P. 277 (1904); Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310,92 S.E. 454 (1917); Reed v. Pitkin, 
231 Mich. 621, 204 N.W. 750 (1925); Lightner v. W.H. Hill Co., 258 Mich. 50,242 N.W. 
218 (1932); Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945); Fox v. 
Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P.2d 224 (1945). 
36. E.g., Goodwin v. Agassis, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). See also the 
numerous cases cited in 84 A.L.R. 615, 616-18 to the effect that an insider generally does 
not have a fiduciary obligation to disclose to individual shareholders any inside information 
when purchasing from or selling to such shareholders. 
37. See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1908); Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 
419 (1909); Porter v. Healey, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914); Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 
509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916); Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S.E. 454 (1917); Hotch­
kiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 
248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). 
38. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Servo Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Diamond 
V. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). 
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eral courts applying Rule lOb-5, both the misrepresentation and unjust 
enrichment theories are invoked. Thus in Strong v. Repide,39 the 
Supreme Court was influenced both by the substantial injury suffered 
by the plaintiff in selling shares at a price substantially below their true 
value and by the unjust benefit obtained by the defendant through "a 
studied and intentional omission ... as part of the deceitful machina­
tions to obtain [the stock] ... at a lower price."40 In Diamond v. 
Oreamuno,41 Chief Judge Fuld noted that the function of a claim 
based upon breach of fiduciary duty through wrongful use of corpo­
rate information was "not merely to compensate the plaintiff for 
wrongs committed by the defendant but ... to prevent them, by re­
moving from agents and trustees all inducement to attempt dealing for 
their own benefit in matters which they have undertaken for 
others. . . . "42 
Because two distinct theories or concepts concerning the interests 
and parties involved have supported a finding of liability under the 
common law, it should not be surprising that reference was made to a 
number of active misrepresentation, nondisclosure, or concealment 
and unjust enrichment cases when Rule lOb-5 later came to be applied 
to insider trading situations. In Cady, Roberts & Co., the Securities 
and Exchange Commission traced the common law development from 
Strong, Hotchkiss v. Fischer and other common law cases in laying out 
the bases upon which liability could be imposed.43 However, the 
Commission went even further in holding that the application of Rule 
lOb-5 was not confined to the limits of such common law principles 
but rather that the separate statutory scheme of the federal securities 
laws created an independent basis for prohibiting insider trad~ng. In 
the Commission's view, authority derived from the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934 enabled the Commission to extend protection to 
persons not protected under the common law.44 Thus in Cady, Rob­
erts & Co. the Commission dismissed the argument that a Curtiss­
Wright director owed no fiduciary duty, and thus was not liable, to 
persons not yet shareholders who had bought the shares of Curtiss­
Wright without access to the same information he had. The Commis­
39. 213 U.S. 419 (1909). 
40. Id. at 433. 
41. 24 N.Y.2d 494,248 N.E.2d 910,301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). Courts in at least two 
other states have declined to follow the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in Dia­
mond v. Oreamuno. See, e.g., Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975) and Freeman v. 
Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978). 
42. Diamond, 24 N.Y.2d at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81. 
43. 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-14 (1961). 
44. Id. at 913-14. 
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sion held that the purposes underlying the federal securities laws ne­
cessitated an obligation to disclose or refrain from trading on the part 
of insiders even with respect to persons and investors not presently 
shareholders.45 The Commission set out what it believed to be the 
appropriate elements for establishing violation of Rule 1Ob-5 with re­
spect to insider trading: 
We have already noted that the anti-fraud provisions are 
phrased in terms of 'any person' and that a special obligation has 
been traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, direc­
tors and controlling stockholders. These three groups, however, do 
not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an obli­
gation. Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; 
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indi­
rectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the 
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such 
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is deal­
ing. In considering these elements under the broad language of the 
anit-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed by fine distinc­
tions and rigid classifications. Thus our task here is to identify 
those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and 
privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in 
trading in its securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest the unin­
formed be exploited.46 
The principles crafted in Cady, Roberts first were embraced judi­
cially in Texas GulfSulphur.47 In its introductory discussion of Rule 
1Ob-5, the Second Circuit also took note of the Strong and Hotchkiss 
precedents at common law and then restated the general principle ar­
ticulated in Cady, Roberts, that is, that liability is premised upon the 
access to material, nonpublic information not generally available.48 
However, while the Cady, Roberts formulation had definite overtones 
relating to the wrongful use by and unjust enrichment of the insider 
having access to material, non public information, the Texas Gulf 
Sulphur opinion recast the prohibition to turn on the possession of 
such information: 
Thus, anyone in [the] possession of material inside information 
must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled 
from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he 
45. Id. at 913. 
46. Id. at 912 (emphasis added). 
47. 401 F.2d at 848. 
48. Id. 
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chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recom­
mending the securities concerned while such inside information re­
mains undisclosed.49 
This viewpoint, which came to be characterized as the "posses­
sion" theory of Rule lOb-5, was followed in a number of subsequent 
federal court cases,50 including, of course, the lower court decision in 
the Chiarella case which was reversed by the Supreme Court in 1980. 
The standard generally applied in those cases was that any person­
"corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic 
information may not use that information to trade in securities with­
out incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."51 In other words, the 
mere possession of material, nonpublic information gave rise to the 
duty to disclose or abstain. 
The Supreme Court in Chiarella rejected this theory, holding that 
"a duty to disclose under § lO(b) does not arise from the mere posses­
sion of nonpublic market information."52 In the Court's view, the 
insider with access to such information must have a preexisting duty 
to disclose arising out of some relationship with the other participants 
in the securities transactions. Justice Powell, writing on behalf of the 
majority, cites three examples of such a relationship: (1) agency, (2) a 
fiduciary relationship, or (3) some other arrangement pursuant to 
which "the sellers had placed their trust and confidence" in the de­
fendant.53 In support of such a requirement, the Court noted the dis­
tinction sometimes made at common law between affirmative 
misrepresentation and nondisclosure cases wherein liability attached 
to the latter only if the defendant breached a duty to the other parties 
through its silence. 54 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the 
Court observed that a duty to disclose ordinarily arises "when one 
party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know be­
cause of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence between 
them.' "55 
As others have noted, the actual holding of the court in Chiarella 
is quite narrow, namely, that the mere possession of material, nonpub­
49. Id. 
50. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d 
Cir. 1974); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Haven 
Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation, 462 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Nathanson v. 
Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
51. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365. 
52. 445 U.S. at 235. 
53. Id. at 232. 
54. Id. at 228. 
55. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976». 
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lic information is insufficient to create a duty to disclose or to refrain 
from trading. S6 In the context of the objectives or interests underlying 
prohibitions on insider trading, such a holding is equivalent to saying 
that the mere fact that shareholders (existing or future) are injured by 
being at an informational disadvantage, without more, does not estab­
lish or constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5. Regrettably, the majority 
opinion of the Court addresses neither the significance of the other 
interests such as possible injury to property rights or injury to the mar­
ket, nor the relevance of issues of unjust enrichment. S7 
In Dirks, the Supreme Court took some pains to reemphasize its 
rejection of the parity of information theory previously espoused by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, reaffirming its position in 
Chiarella that a duty to disclose can only arise from "a specific rela­
tionship between two parties."s8 In the Court's view, a tippee could be 
liable only if the insider from whom the tippee receives the informa­
tion has violated such a duty to disclose: 
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the share­
holders not because they receive inside information, but rather be­
cause it has been made available to them improperly . ... Thus, a 
tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation 
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the in­
sider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclos­
ing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should 
know that there has been a breach. S9 
After Chiarella and Dirks, persons seeking to impose liability 
upon others for insider trading activities-whether the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or private claimants-thus have three princi­
pal alternatives open to them: 
1. establish that the person trading had some relationship with 
the other participants that creates a duty to disclose; 
2. pursue an alternative theory for breach of duty, such as 
misappropriation; or 
3. distinguish Chiarella and Dirks on the grounds of the nar­
56. Justice Burger was careful to emphasize in his dissent that the actual holding of 
the majority was thus so limited. See 445 U.S. at 243, n.4. See also Note, supra note 12, at 
507. 
57. The majority opinion noted the alternative theory offered by the government to 
find a breach of duty based upon Chiarella's wrongful appropriation of the information. 
The Court did not reach that issue on the ground that it had not been submitted to the jury. 
445 U.S. at 235-36. 
58. 463 U.S. at 654-55. 
59. Id. at 660. 
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row holdings relating to the mere possession of inside information 
and establish presence of additional factors supporting a basis for 
relief. 
For the great majority of insider trading cases, there will be a relation­
ship (for example, director or officer status, independent contractor or 
agent) which can be identified. In those situations the Chiarella and 
Dirks holdings allow for the imposition of liability. In outsider trading 
situations, however, where there is no specific relationship, trouble­
some transactions or conduct still may occur, and it is as to these that 
we now turn our attention. 
IV. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 
Given the groundwork laid in both Justice Stevens' concurring 
opinion60 and Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion61 in Chiarella, 
it has not taken the lower federal courts much time to develop a mis­
appropriation theory to cover many of those situations where a fiduci­
ary duty cannot easily be established. 
Under the current formulation of the misappropriation theory, a 
person violates section lO(b) whenever he improperly obtains or con­
verts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then uses in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.62 The misappropri­
ation theory represents a potentially significant advance toward catch­
ing the outsider trader in two respects. First, it eliminates the 
requirement that an insider breach a fiduciary duty to shareholders 
prior to finding a violation.63 Secondly, it does not make any distinc­
tion between persons (that is, tippees) who directly obtain inside infor­
mation from an insider who breaches a duty in disclosing that 
information and persons who otherwise obtain inside information un­
lawfully or improperly.64 Under the theory, traders violate section 
lO(b) when they obtain nonpublic information illegitimately.65 
This is not to say that under the misappropriation theory there is 
no inquiry into the relationship between various of the parties 10­
60. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238-39. 
61. Id. at 239-45. 
62. Materia, 745 F.2d at 201; Newman, 664 F.2d at 16-17. 
63. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
64. See, e.g., SEC v. Thayer, 17 SEC. REC. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 841 (1985) 
(where an "insider" misappropriated information in breach of fiduciary duty), and Winans, 
612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (where an employee of a newspaper misappropriated 
market information). 
65. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (Burger, C.l., dissenting). "A person who has misap­
propriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to 
refrain from trading." Id. 
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volved. Indeed, the first step in the analysis remains a determination 
that some of the parties "stand in some confidential or fiduciary rela­
tion."66 However, the important distinction is that the field of rele­
vant relationships is not limited to that between the trader and the 
shareholders with whom he trades. Rather, the field is opened to rela­
tionships including parties who, while injured by the violation, are 
neither purchasers nor sellers of the securities in question.67 
The misappropriation theory was applied for the first time and 
upheld by the Second Circuit in Newman,68 a case decided under the 
shadow of Chiarella. In Newman, a brokerage firm manager was 
found criminally liable for purchasing the stock of companies that 
soon thereafter became takeover targets. Newman learned of the im­
pending takeovers through employees of investment banking firms 
whose clients "engaged in corporate mergers, acquisitions, tender of­
fers, and other takeovers."69 The government did .not allege, nor did 
the court hold, that the shareholders who sold their stock to Newman 
had been defrauded. Having no fiduciary relationship with those 
shareholders, temporary or otherwise, Newman had no duty under 
Chiarella to disclose to the sellers.70 No insider had breached a fiduci­
ary duty; the corporate insiders had revealed the information legiti­
mately and in confidence to the investment banking firms. Thus, 
under the reasoning of Dirks, Newman would have no liability for the 
transactions affected. Nevertheless, the court held that Newman was 
criminally liable for violation of Rule lOb-5 in that he had participated 
in a breach of trust and confidence shared between the investment 
banking firm and its corporate clients. The breach, according to the 
opinion, sullied the reputation of the investment banking firms "as safe 
repositories of client confidences. "71 In addition, the purchases "artifi­
cially inflated" the stock prices of the target companies, thereby injur­
66. Id. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
67. As might be anticipated, this raises a right of standing issue because of the nar­
row limits to a private right of action under the securities laws. See 445 U.S. at 238 (Ste­
vens, J., concurring). This has not proven, however, to be a serious obstacle to application 
of the misappropriation theory. See infra note 79. But see Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 
719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). 
68. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). 
69. Id. at 15. 
70. Id. at 15. Indeed, because there was no fiduciary relationship, the Second Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal, for lack of standing, of subsequent suits by shareholders who had 
traded with Newman. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1983). 
In Newman, the court held that the standing issue was not relevant to a criminal action. 
664 F.2d at 17. 
71. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16-17. 
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ing the corporate clients.72 
The Second Circuit reaffirmed the principles of the misappropria­
tion theory in Materia. 73 The facts of the case were strikingly similar 
to the Chiarella circumstances. The defendant, Materia, was a copy 
reader for Bowne of New York City, Inc., a financial printing firm. 
Among the printing services performed for clients by Bowne was the 
preparation of proposed tender offer filings. Bowne made every effort 
to keep such corporate information confidential, using both blanks and 
code names for companies that were attempting takeovers and/or 
were the subject of takeover attempts. In addition, Bowne had posted 
notices visible to its employees that warned against trading on infor­
mation discovered in the course of their work. In spite of these efforts 
and disregarding the warnings, Materia ascertained from information 
at the printing firm the names of at least four companies that were 
soon to be takeover targets. In each case, Materia purchased stock in 
the target before the announcement of a tender offer. Upon the stock's 
increasing in value after the announcements, Materia sold his shares.74 
The Securities and Exchange Commission charged Materia with 
violations of sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 
as well as Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3. The Commission's theory was that 
Materia had traded "on the basis of material nonpublic information he 
had misappropriated from his employer and its clients."75 Materia ar­
gued that under the Chiarella holding his actions were not illegaP6 
The Commission argued, and the Second Circuit agreed, that Materia 
had perpetrated a fraud against his employer. The employer, in tum, 
enjoyed a confidential relationship with those companies who had 
shared confidential information with Bowne for the purpose of prepar­
ing the tender offer materials. By "trading on confidences," Materia 
"undermined" the relationship between the printing firm and its 
clients.77 
Importantly, the fact that Materia did not learn of the informa­
tion in question from insiders of the issuer is irrelevant under the mis­
appropriation theory. The information need only be improperly 
obtained.78 It is similarly irrelevant that neither the employer nor its 
clients were the persons who traded with or at the same time as 
72. Id. at 17-18. 
73. 745 F.2d at 201. 
74. Id. at 199. 
75. Id. at 199-200. 
76. Id. at 201. 
77. Id. at 202. 
78. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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Materia. In other words, if a confidential relationship with another 
party has been breached by the misappropriator, and the misappropri­
ation relates to information regarding the securities of an issuer, that is 
sufficient to constitute being "in connection with" a purchase or sale of 
securities.79 
A more recent application of the theory occurred in Winans. so 
There, R. Foster Winans, formerly one of the authors of the "Heard 
on the Street" column of the Wall Street Journal, was charged with 
violating section 1 O(b) by disclosing to others the timing, content, and 
tenor of market-sensitive stories about various companies. The other 
individuals proceeded to trade in the securities of the issuer in question 
in advance of the story's publication, realizing a profit when the mar­
ket value of the securities went up or down after the column ap­
peared.8) The government's principal theory was that since Winans 
knew, pursuant to the Wall Street Journal's policies, that "he was not 
supposed to leak the timing or contents of his articles or trade on that 
knowledge," his appropriation of the confidential information regard­
ing the nature and timing of those articles for the personal benefit of 
himself and the co-conspirators operated as a fraud upon his 
employer.82 
Winans argued that application of the misappropriation theory 
was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Chiarella and 
Dirks that a duty to disclose exists only if a "specific relationship [ex­
ists] between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside in­
formation."83 Federal District Judge Stewart distinguished Chiarella 
and Dirks simply by classifying those decisions as "one chapter [of the 
book on insider or outsider trading] with respect to one type of fraudu­
lent trading. That type is not before US."84 Winans also contended 
that applying the misappropriation theory essentially was equivalent 
to adopting the "parity of information" doctrine expressly rejected in 
Chiarella. Judge Stewart disagreed, responding: 
The Chiarella majority also did not accept the view that an infor­
mational advantage which is not 'legally available to others,' known 
as the access to information theory, should be the basis for drawing 
the line. 445 U.S. at 235 n.20, 100 S. Ct. at 1118 n.20, see also 
79. The court characterized Materia's argument that his actions were not "in con­
nection with" a purchase or sale as "spurious." 745 F.2d at 203. 
80. 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
81. Id. at 829-38. 
82. Id. at 842. 
83. Id. at 841. 
84. Id. at 842. 
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Dirks, supra, 463 U.S. at 672, 103 S. Ct. at 327. But we do not agree 
that the misappropriation theory is in conflict. The focus of the ap­
proach before us is not on whether the defendant had an informa­
tional advantage that others could not legally obtain, but on how the 
defendant gained the advantage, which must befraudulently.85 
While various federal courts, particularly in the Second Circuit, 
thus have succeeded, through use of the misappropriation theory, in 
imposing liability in unique situations left unprotected by the fiduciary 
duty standard of Chiarella, there are several conceptual problems in­
volved with the use of such a theory. As has been noted elsewhere,86 
there is concern whether the theory is consistent with Santa Fe Indus­
tries, Inc. v. Green.87 Under the reasoning of the latter case, no action 
lies under Rule lOb-5 for claims based upon mismanagement or 
breach of fiduciary duty unless the alleged conduct involved some de­
ception or misrepresentation regarding either the purchase or sale of 
securities. 88 The conduct which constitutes a breach of duty in cases 
such as Newman, Materia, or Winans sounds more like breach of con­
tract than a deception or misrepresentation regarding the purchase or 
sale of securities. On the other hand, one can point to approving com­
ments in the legislative history of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act as 
indicative of Congress' tacit endorsement of the misappropriation the­
ory and its intent that prohibitions of Rule lOb-5 encompass such 
activities.89 
A more difficult conceptual issue is when and how to delineate 
the relevant relationships which will or will not support a misappro­
priation claim under Rule lOb-5. The reasoning and approach used by 
a number of the federal courts to find a relationship which has been 
breached often seems artificial or strained. In Newman, it was undis­
puted that the investment banking firms shared a confidential relation­
ship with their clients who were the issuers of the securities in 
question. There was, however, no relationship between Newman and 
the investment banking firms or between Newman and the issuers. 
Why did Newman owe a duty to the investment banking firms to "ab­
stain or disclose"? He was not their agent. The investment banking 
firms' own employees had committed the breach. Was their duty to 
their employer transferred to Newman upon their disclosure of the 
85. Id. (emphasis added). 
86. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 11, at 46-49; Note, supra note 12, at 523; Phil­
lips and Zutz, supra note 12, at 91-92. 
87. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
88. Id. at 474-477. 
89. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text. 
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information? If this was the court's reasoning, it is no less circuitous 
and artificial than that used to find derivative fiduciary duties for tip­
pees.90 Where does the transfer of the duty to disclose stop? Are 
persons who learn from Newman and trade also liable? What about 
traders who receive the information fifth-hand and sixth-hand? 
The application of the misappropriation theory in the cited cases 
raises questions as to the appropriate guidelines for determining when 
confidential relationships exist that are subsequently breached by trad­
ing activities. While in Materia and Winans the employee-employer 
relationship created a presumption of confidentiality between Materia 
and Bowne and between Winans and the Wall Street Journal, other 
relationships may not give rise to such a presumption. Persons may 
trade on material, non public information from sources who are merely 
business associates. In other cases, the relationship of the source of 
the information may range from a family member to a passing ac­
quaintance.91 Yet in these latter situations the prospects for the per­
90. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
One of the more interesting recent insider trading cases initiated by the Securities & 
Exchange Commission concerned the alleged breach of trust arising out of a psychiatrist­
patient relationship. A psychiatrist who treated the spouse of an official of Posi-Seal Inter­
national, Inc., was alleged to have engaged in trading transactions based upon information 
disclosed to the psychiatrist in the course of the treatment. The Commission alleged viola­
tions of the insider trading provisions, claiming among other matters that the information 
had been disclosed to the psychiatrist under the expectation that all information would be 
kept confidential. The charges were settled without admission or denial by agreement of 
the psychiatrist to disgorge profits made and by payment of a civil penalty. Wall St. J., 
March 4, 1986, at 10, col. 4. 
91. Some of the difficulties involved with a determination of confidentiality are illus­
trated in the recent case of United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The 
relevant facts were that the Standard Oil Company of California intended to purchase all of 
the outstanding shares of Amax, Inc., at a price that was approximately twice the market 
value. Thomas Reed allegedly learned of this offer from his father, Gordon Reed, who was 
a member of the Amax board of directors. Thomas Reed had no relationship with Amax 
or Standard Oil. His father's disclosure of the impending offer, it was alleged, was made in 
confidence "and on the expectation that the son would not trade ...." Id. at 698-99. 
Thomas Reed purchased call options at a total cost of slightly more than $3,000 prior to 
public announcement of the offer. After the announcement, he realized total profits ex­
ceeding $400,000. 
Thomas Reed moved to dismiss the charges, contending that he did not have the req­
uisite relationship of trust and confidence to enable an action to be sustained against him. 
The court, in an extensive review of both federal securities case law and common law prin­
ciples of confidentiality, attempted to provide some guidelines for a legal determination of 
the requisite confidential relationship. Id. at 703-18. It ultimately held that the govern­
ment would prevail if it could show at trial that Reed and his father were bound by an 
understanding of confidentiality, express or implied, or that some regular pattern of behav­
ior by Reed and his father generated a justifiable expression of confidentiality and fidelity. 
Id. at 718. While noting that three elements are generally recognized as aspects to a confi­
dential relationship, i.e., "disparity of position," reliance, and "controlling influence," the 
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son trading to obtain unjust gains and for others to be injured thereby 
are equally as great as they were in Materia and Winans. 
Thus we question both the utility and appropriateness of such an 
alternative relationship inquiry. Aside from the difficulties inherent in 
such a determination, a confidential relationship requirement suffers 
from the same drawback as the fiduciary duty standard of Chiarella­
it fails to focus on the central issue of the purposes and objectives un­
derlying prohibitions against insider trading generally. 
To be sure, injuries to various property rights have been sustained 
in the misappropriation cases decided to date. In Newman, the injury 
concerned the reputation of the investment banking firms and the fact 
that their clients might have had to pay more in the tender offers being 
effected.92 In Materia, the reputation of the printing firm was at risk;93 
in Winans, the injury sustained was to the Wall Street Journal and its 
reputation.94 However, those are not the core interests or objectives 
involved; they are cited only because the lower federal courts have 
been unsure what otherwise to rely upon in light of the narrow and 
restrictive holdings of Chiarella and Dirks. The issues really involved 
include (1) the unjust enrichment of Newman, Materia, and Winans 
through the use of information not even intended to be available for 
their personal benefit; (2) the losses suffered by persons selling or buy­
ing securities on the opposite end of these trading transactions without 
access to the same information; and (3) the injury to the integrity of 
the securities markets themselves. While the misappropriation cases 
add an interesting chapter and a formula which occasionally will be 
useful in covering transactions not strictly within the fiduciary duty 
standard of Chiarella, we might well ask whether it is not time to con­
clude that a broader hypothesis is needed than that articulated m 
either Chiarella, Dirks, or the misappropriation cases. 
v. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT 
In formulating a broader hypothesis, we need to factor in the en­
actment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA).95 At 
court conceded that there is a "lack of universality and uniformity of practice among courts 
and commentators in their analysis." Generally whether a confidential relationship exists 
is an issue of fact to be determined by the trier of the facts. Id. at 717. 
Reed ultimately was acquitted of criminal charges after a jury trial. 17 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. (BNA) No. 50, at 2179 (Dec. 20, 1985). 
92. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
95. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) 
(Supp. 1985». 
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the time the Securities and Exchange Commission first pressed for 
ITSA, the Commission represented that it merely sought additional 
enforcement remedies and that it was satisfied with the existing sub­
stantive law under Rule lOb-5. Thus, ITSA theoretically merely 
(1) added authority for the Commission to seek civil penalties against 
persons engaged in unlawful insider trading of up to three times the 
amount of profits made or losses avoided by the person trading,96 and 
(2) extended insider trading prohibitions to option and other deriva­
tive instruments.97 
However, several factors suggest that, in approving ITSA, Con­
gress intended that Rule lOb-5 be given a more expansive application 
with respect to insider trading transactions than the Supreme Court 
has in Chiarella and Dirks. Indeed, one can assert with considerable 
force four points in support of the proposition that Congress intended 
that the courts follow principles closer in philosophy to the equal ac­
cess/possession theories of pre-Chiarella cases98 than to the fiduciary 
type standard of Chiarella.99 
The first point to be noted is the language of ITSA itself. The 
conduct which triggers the civil penalty provision of ITSA, now sec­
tion 21 (d)(2)(A) of the 1934 Act, is the purchase or sale of "a security 
while in the possession of material nonpublic information ...."100 
There is no reference to any preexisting duty or fiduciary obligation, 
but merely to "possession" as the jurisdictional nexus. The extension 
of liability to purchasers or sellers of options or other derivative instru­
ments also raises an inference that no preexisting duty or relationship 
is necessary to establish liability, since no fiduciary duty traditionally 
has been owed by corporate officers and directors to option and similar 
security holders. 101 
Secondly, the legislative history of ITSA makes little mention of 
fiduciary or other relationships; rather, it is replete with references to 
informational advantages and differences improperly obtained. The 
House Report quotes favorably from Brudney's masterful article: 
The inability of a public investor with whom an insider trans­
acts on inside information ever lawfully to erode the insider's infor­
96. Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2. 
97. Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 5. 
98. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
100. Pub. L. No. 98-376, §§ 2, 5. 
101. Laventhal v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. de­
nied, 104 S. Ct. 150 (1983). See also Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act and Its 
Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1290-1291 (1984). 
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mational advantage generates a sense of unfairness. The 
unfairness is not a function merely of possessing more informa­
tion-outsiders may possess more information than other outsiders 
by reason of their diligence or zeal-but of the fact that it is an 
advantage which cannot be competed away since it depends upon a 
lawful privilege to which [other investors] cannot acquire access. 102 
The comments of Representatives Wirth and Dingell on the floor of 
the House of Representatives stressed t~e importance of general public 
confidence in the securities markets and the "fundamental expecta­
tions of fairness and honesty," and characterized the conduct of those 
acting on inside information as "thieves."103 Senator D'Amato argued 
in a similar vein on the Senate floor in support of ITSA: 
Some commentators have called insider trading a victimless 
crime, however, I strongly disagree. The investor who trades with a 
person possessing nonpublic inside information is clearly at a severe 
informational disadvantage. In addition, the integrity of the market 
is violated, which results in a loss of investor confidence. John Fed­
ders, the Director of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Di­
vision of Enforcement, has stated publicly that he believes that 
those who engage in insider trading are thieves, I concur whole­
heartedly with Mr. Fedders. 104 
The emphasis in the legislative deliberation thus was on the unjustness 
of the trader's profits and on the injuries suffered, both by sharehold­
ers directly and with respect to the integrity of and public confidence 
in the securities markets when insider trading occurs. 
Thirdly, the circumstances existing at the time of ITSA's enact­
ment suggest that both the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
which initially requested the legislation, and Congress anticipated that 
the Commission should not be restricted by the limitations imposed by 
the Supreme Court in the Chiarella and Dirks decisions. On one hand, 
Chiarella had been rendered moot by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission's subsequent promulgation of Rule 14e-3 under the more 
specific authority of the Willia,ms Act provisions. lOS Conduct by per­
sons in positions similar to Chiarella and Materia thus was in violation 
102. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983, H.R. REP., 98th Cong., 1st Sess, 1, S 
(1983) (citing Brudney, supra note 24, at 346) [hereinafter cited as ITSA] , 
103, 129 CONGo REC. H7012 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Wirth); 
130 CONGo REC. H71S7 (daily ed. July 2S, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
104. 130 CONGo REC. S8912 (daily ed. June 29,1984) (statement of Rep. D'Amato). 
lOS. The language of Rule 14e-3 is nearly identical to that of Rule 10b-S except that 
the former applies specifically to misrepresentations, omissions, and other fraudulent prac­
tices in connection with tender offers. See 17 C.F.R. 240 14e 3. 
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of Rule 14e-3, and criminal and administrative sanctions could be im­
posed as a result of any such violations. Technically, therefore, Rule 
lOb-5 was not needed in order to impose appropriate sanctions on 
traders such as Vincent Chiarella or Anthony Materia. 106 On the other 
hand, the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks, which was issued after 
the initial hearings in ITSA but before its final enactment, initially did 
raise concerns in the congressional committees. Thus, the House 
Committee was prompted to request that the Commission make a fol­
low-up report to Congress on the impact, if any, of Dirks on the Com­
mission's subsequent enforcement activities. 107 
Finally, several of the cases cited approvingly in the House and 
Senate Reports as illustrative of the then current state of Rule lOb-5 
are based upon broader concepts than the Supreme Court espoused in 
Chiarella and Dirks. Thus the House Report cites several examples of 
"the legal principles governing the smaller number of cases that in­
volve trading on market information that originates from sources 
other than the company."108 These include Rule 14e-3, Newman (a 
clear articulation of the misappropriation theory), and SEC v. Lund109 
("temporary insider" liable for transaction based upon nonpublic in­
formation even though no preexisting duty). 
The legislative history of ITSA suggests that the crucial inquiry is 
one similar to that noted by Judge Stewart in Winans-was the infor­
mational advantage improperly obtained, that is, one which others 
cannot obtain through lawful means or competition. 110 
VI. A RESTATED STANDARD 
From the foregoing, we propose the following standard for the 
imposition of insider or outsider trading liability: Whether a trader 
realizes profits or avoids losses whenever trading on an informational 
advantage that the trader knows others cannot obtain through lawful 
means or competition. The objectives and interests to be served should 
be clear from our prior discussion. The relevant questions remaining 
at this point are: (1) Will this standard pass muster with the Supreme 
Court? (2) Does such a standard address any more effectively the con­
106. It is interesting to note that in SEC v. Materia, the Second Circuit not with­
standing the availability of Rule 14e-3 as a basis for imposing liability, chose to employ the 
more general Rule IOb-5 utilizing the misappropriation theory. See supra notes 73-79 and 
accompanying text. 
107. ITSA supra note 102, at 14-15. 
108. Id. at 13, n.20. 
109. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983). 
110. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 842. 
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cerns which spawned the limiting principles of Chiarella and Dirks? 
(3) Is there really any need for such a refurbished standard? 
We tum first to the question of whether our standard would pass 
muster with the Supreme Court. One might expect that a future de­
fendant being subjected to this standard would claim, as did Winans, 
that the formulation is essentially the same as the parity of informa­
tion standard rejected in Chiarella and Dirks. There are three appro­
priate responses to that argument. First, as Judge Stewart noted in his 
Winans decision, the focus is not on the disparity of informational ad­
vantage, but rather on how the defendant obtained such, that is, 
through wrongful conduct. III Where a defendant obtains an informa­
tional advantage by his own effort and initiative and without acting 
wrongfully, that defendant will have no liability. Second, our stan­
dard is consistent with what the common law long has recognized as 
proper bases for an unjust enrichment claim, namely, where a person 
unfairly or in bad faith benefits from the infringement of another per­
son's interest. 112 Third, in its enactment of ITSA, Congress expressed 
specific views with respect to the policies underlying prohibitions on 
insider trading, indicating support and approval of doctrines and cases 
broader than those articulated in Chiarella and Dirks.ll3 
Another argument might utilize that concern which caused the 
Supreme Court to fashion the limiting principles articulated in 
Chiarella and Dirks, namely, the problem of linkage between the 
wrongful insider trading and the ascertainable amount of injuries suf­
fered by others. Indeed, that problem is present even in the most 
traditional of insider-trading-type cases, that is, when a corporate of­
ficer or director trades on inside corporate information. It is a prob­
lem inherent in the fact that from a particular trading transaction 
three possible types of injuries may result, 114 someone wrongfully will 
receive an unjust benefit, and none of these is necessarily mathemati­
cally related to any other. Two solutions suggest themselves, and 
neither is novel. In the first instance, where ascertainable damages are 
not claimed and/or cannot be shown, as, for example, in the Newman 
or Winans situations, we may continue not to recognize private actions 
but rely instead upon criminal and administrative sanctions to protect 
and carry out the intended objectives. lIs Secondly, we can choose to 
111. Id. 
112. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra text at notes 21-25. 
115. This has been the approach followed generally with respect to cases brought 
under the misappropriation theory where the principal injury established was to the owner 
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measure damages in a manner consistent with the fourth interest un­
derlying insider trading prohibitions,116 namely, by restitution from 
the wrongdoer of the amount by which he has been unjustly 
enriched. I 17 
Reference to the principles of unjust enrichment and the law of 
restitution also may serve us well with respect to the Supreme Court's 
concern for certainty and guidance to persons engaged in securities 
transactions as to when liability may attach. The concepts of unjust 
enrichment are not foreign or difficult to grasp; indeed, there is a great 
deal of legal doctrine developed from contract law which may help 
differentiate between persons acting properly and in good faith and 
persons knowingly exploiting an advantage improperly obtained. Fur­
thermore, it seems to us that the emphasis on the propriety of the 
trader's use and whether or not others have comparable opportunity 
to obtain the information should assure that the activities of financial 
analysis and other lawful market intermediaries will not be foreclosed 
or unfairly impinged upon. I IS 
Lastly, we come to the question of whether we need a reformu­
lated standard. If the fiduciary standard of Chiarella works for most 
traditional insider cases, if Rule 14e-3 will cover most tender offer situ­
ations, and if the misappropriation theory can be applied in many 
other unique settings, why bother with any other standard? We sug­
gest three brief responses. First, we submit that the alternative formu­
lation proposed more directly reflects both the interest served by 
insider trading prohibitions and the historical common law remedies 
available to injured parties. By this we mean that an appropriate stan­
dard should focus as much on the improper conduct of the trader and 
the benefits unjustly received by him as it does on the parties and inter­
ests seeking to be protected. The fiduciary principle espoused in 
Chiarella, on the other hand, ignores both if the court can find no 
preexisting duty or relationship between the parties. Second, such a 
standard obviates the necessity for creating or rationalizing the exist­
ence of a relationship which has been breached as in some of the mis­
appropriation cases. Finally, our standard may enable the 
of the confidential information. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 
1983); contra the pending action instituted by Anheuser-Busch, Inc., against Paul Thayer 
supra note 22. 
116. See supra text at notes 26-27. 
117. See generally Thompson, The Measure ofRecovery Under rule JOb-5: A Restitu­
tion Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 365-380 (1984). 
118. Brudney discussed this matter at length in his 1979 article. While other issues 
raised by him were cited by the Supreme Court in the Chiarella and Dirks decisions, this 
part of his analysis was overlooked or disregarded. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 360-64. 
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Commission or a court to reach troublesome' conduct which under 
either the fiduciary duty standard or the misappropriation theory 
would not be viewed as unlawful. 
To illustrate this last point, we would recall the case decided two 
years ago of Barry Switzer, the University of Oklahoma head football 
coach. 119 Switzer overheard, at a track meet, inside information about 
a corporation which was not intended for his use. 120 Switzer recog­
nized the information as material, nonpublic information and not only 
bought shares to profit personally on the information, but spread the 
tip to other business associates so they also could share in inside 
profits. 121 
The information concerned the proposed liquidation of a publicly 
traded company engaged in oil and gas exploration. Prior to the dis­
semination of that information, die company's common stock was 
trading in the $39-$42 range; after the public announcement of the 
Board of Directors' intentions, the value of the stock increased first to 
$61 per share and subsequently to as high as $79 718. Switzer and the 
other persons who traded on the basis of the information realized ag­
gregate profits of approximately $591,000. 122 
The Oklahoma federal district court judge, applying the Chiarella 
and Dirks analysis, found no breach of duty by the insider who had 
been discussing the nonpublic information which Switzer overheard 
and concluded that none of the persons involved in the trading activi­
ties thus could be liable as tippees. 123 That outcome is a classic exam­
ple of the limitations and deficiencies of the fiduciary duty standard of 
Chiarella and Dirks. 
Under the standard we propose above, persons in those circum­
stances would be found liable if and when they trade on information 
they know is material, nonpublic, and not intended for their own bene­
fit. In other words, once a person is aware that he has an informa­
119. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
120. Id. at 762. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the complaining party in 
the proceeding, obviously believed that Switzer's overhearing the information was not all 
that accidental, but rather that the information had been expressed aloud by the insider for 
Switzer's benefit. The Commission, however, was unable to support that belief with suffi­
cient independent evidence. Id. at 768. 
Professor Aldave cites this case as an example of fortuitious discovery of insider infor­
mation for which no sanctions would apply under existing theories of lOb-5 liability. Al­
dave, supra note 11 at 122, n.1l5. We disagree and believe it represents an example of 
troublesome conduct that a broader formulation as to trading liability should cover. 
121. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. at 766. Court said that the plaintiffs had not proven that 
the defendant knew the information was material. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 766. 
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tional advantage which no other person then participating in the 
marketplace can duplicate through research or other lawful means, 
that person will be liable under the standard we propose. 124 
Evaluating Switzer's and similar outside traders' conduct in the 
context of the interests we have identified in this article, imposition of 
liability appears a most appropriate result. In the first instance, we 
can identify a known class of shareholders injured by the Switzer 
group's improper use of the inside information, that is, those persons 
on the opposite sides of the market transactions without either access 
to such information or any comparable opportunity to obtain the 
same. We know that those persons lost possible profits at least equal 
to those obtained by the quickly formed Switzer trading group, that is, 
at least $591,000. Secondly, we know that use of inside information in 
such a manner will tend to undermine public confidence in the integ­
rity of the marketplace. Thirdly, and perhaps most significant in this 
instance, is the substantial enrichment of those trading on the inside 
information, the possession of which was not a result of their own 
effort, skill, or diligence, but, at best, of fortuitous circumstances or, at 
worst, of lack of care or intentional favoritism by an insider. The im­
position of liability in such a circumstance thus would further the in­
terests underlying prohibition on insider trading and still avoid 
impinging upon the activities of persons lawfully engaged in research, 
trading, or investment activities. It is regrettable that some lower 
courts, such as in the Switzer case, have chosen not to explore beyond 
the limits of the Chiarella and Dirks fiduciary duty standard. We hope 
that this article has laid out a logical and historically based means for 
doing so-with the ultimate objective that the outer limits of insider 
trading liability reach to all improper conduct. 
124. As a practical matter, that probably means that a claim of "fortuitous discov­
ery" of the information will afford no defense, so long as the person then traded with 
knowledge that the information was non public, material, and afforded them a very distinct 
trading advantage over others. 
